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'TWAS A DAY IN NOVEMBER
'Twas a day in November when at old Purdue
The collegiate debates were down to the top two.
They set up their cases and files with care;
;j The timer, onlookers, and judges were there.
The first man was ready and rose to his place.
With file cards in hand, he began the debate.
Point after point with his voice did he beat.
And those things important he'd be sure to repeat.
He said, "Guaranteed health care is a citizen's right.
And the system won't give the poor power to fight."
Yet all of his faults did the negative see.
For when giving his speech he cried, "CAUSALITYl"
"You can't blame the system for all of the cause!".
The negative cried as he quoted some laws.
Point by point he cut down their case.
And made the affirmative side a disgrace.
The second affirm, had the common cold blues.
And when he would cough his fast pace would he lose.
His ten minutes up, he quit with a frown.
Returned to his seat, some cough syrup to down.
The last one was up for the constructive round;
His speech was the same kind of fast beating sound.
Yet one thing was done that was quite unique.
He had his partner read a hst from his seat.
The time was reduced from ten minutes to five.
Yet the rebuttal speeches were just as alive.
So fast did they speak throughout the whole round.
It was lucky I heard, let alone write it down.
The judges were fast and could write every word;
But too, this topic before had they heard.
The sources and quotes were foreign to me.
Yet all of the meaning they could easily see.
The speeches were done, they'd presented their case;
For the judges' decision the whole room did wait.
It seemed like hours till one judge arose,
"The victory today to the negative goes!"
Cynthia Essex
Timekeeper
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COLLEGIATE DEBATE: THE CONFESSIONS
OF A FRUSTRATED DEBATER
Herman J. Marino
H. W. Johnstone, Jr., in the introduction of his book, Philosophy,
Ehetoric and Augumentation, states: "When we wish to control the
actions or beliefs of another person, but either lack an effective means
of control or have an effective means that we nevertheless do not wish
to use, we argue with the person."i-2 This fs a fairly adequate description
of the contemporary collegiate debate circuit. However, to assume that
logic in general and formal logic in particular is a sine qua non of debate,
as was the case for Aristotle, is more equivocation than actual fact. Recent
criticisms of debaters for their lack of ethos and their refusal to employ
pathos has deteriorated their use of logos.^ It is my intention to demon
strate this lack of logical rigor in coUegiate debate, based on my three
years of experience with coUege debate theory,^ and to present some
remedial suggestions.
With respect to the classroom situation, a quick survey of debate texts
demonstrates that few do adequate justice to the field of logic. Further
analysis reveals that (1) no book presents the tenets of logic in any
completeness, (2) there is no consistency among the books in the degree
of completeness, and (3) there is no agreement on which tenets of formal
logic need to be presented.® When I was taught debate by a collegiate
debate coach® and by one of the more reputable former debaters of the
coUege circuit,'' less than two lectures apiece were devoted to the modes
of logic, formal or material.
Within the debate setting itself most collegiate advocates present super
ficial analyses of "needs, desirability and practicality," resulting in cases
constructed of equivocation, oversimplification and illogicality.® There
are several reasons for this phenomenon. First, the debate proposition, and
ultimately the debate itself, mandates a two-valued type of logic. The
debate proposition, by definition, is answerable by a yes or a no. The
Herman J. Marino is a senior student and member of the Honors Program at
Loyola University in Chicago, Illinois.
' Maurice Natanson and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., Philosophy, Rhetoric, and
Argumentation (University Park, Permsylvania: Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1965) p. 1.
^Douglas Ehninger, "Argument as Method: Its Nature, Its Limitations and
Its Uses," Speech Monographs, 37 (June, 1970), pp. 101-108.
" Arthur N. Kruger, "The Ethics of Persuasion: A Re-Examination," The Speech
Teacher, 16 (November, 1967), pp. 295-305.
^ The author has had three years experience with argumentation under the
study of two noted and experienced debate coaches: Dr. M. Jack Parker, Head
Coach, Northern Illinois University, and Mrs. Cheryn Wall, former captain,
Butler University Debate team.
" William S. Smith, "Formal Logic in Debate" Southern Speech Journal, 27
(February, 1968) pp. 330-338.
" Dr. M. Jack Parker, Head Debate Coach, Northern Illinois University.
' Mrs. Cheryn WaU, Captain, Debate Team, Butler University.
® Arthur N. Kruger, "Logic and Strategy in Developing the Debate Case"
The Speech Teacher, 18 (February, 1969), pp. 89-106.
5
et al.: Complete Issue 10(3)
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato,
64 SPEAKER AND GAVEL
debate proposition is one of policy and by demanding a yes or no answer,
it assumes the fallacy of tlie all or nothing assumption and precludes
middle-ground analyses.
Second, the parameters of validity employed in debate are not in line
with those of formal logic. Validity of the debate case gravitates around
the establishment of a need for altering the status quo, the advantages of
this change and the operational efficacy of such action." The structure
of these three pha.ses of the case can and generally are fraught with
fallacious reasoning but this possibility is not paramount in the judge's
consideration.^" While a possible major consideration within the political
realm, the establishment of a need for a change from the status quo does
not constitute a necessary AND sufficient condition for acceptance of
the proposition. For example, in the following cU*gument the conclusion
seems warranted through the "needs" imperative:
All those programs that stifle freedom are programs that should be
abolished.
The Selective Service Commission is a program that stifles freedom.
Ergo., The Selective Service Commission should be abolished.
While the argument is formally valid it presumes an existential com
mitment in the premises, namely that the term "all those programs"
includes the specific program of the Selective Service Commission, thus
qualifying the formal validity of the argument.
In addition, debaters often equi\'Ocate the term "needs" in an argument.
VVhOe the term, in a strict sense, refers to the (}uantified establishment of
evils in the present system, many debaters employ "needs" to mean a
motivational need for change, and thus re.sort to appeals to authority to
justify this "felt, inner need."
This same analysis can be applied to both the desirability and practicality
issues in u dei)ate. While often lielpful in decisions of a political policy,
such concepts are not necessaiy and sufficient parameters of valiclity as
they reduce advocacy to mere pragmatic considerations." Although one
might argue that the issues of need, desirability and practicality con
stitute a pattern of thought—a distinct logic endemic to the debate set
ting—the point is that there is little logical rigor in\(3lved in this rhetorical
framework.
Tliere arc several other non-logical considerations wliich must permeate
the subslructuie of a debate before the judge's decision is final. Internal
consistency is considered to be almost mandatory witlhn the debate stmc-
ture.'- While inconsistency is one of the formal fallacies that should be
avoided, internal consistency is by no means e{]uivalent to logical rigor
in tofo. There are numerous other fallacies which can neutralize an argu
ment but which do not gravitate around internal consistency. To ignore
this fact is more of a fallacy than to emphasize the non-contradictory
imperative.
Another heretofore significant measure of validity has been the number
" Wayne Eubank, "Developing the Ca.se," Argumentation and Debate: Principles
ami Practices, ed., James McBatli (New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston,
1963), pp. 103-123.
Douglas Ehninger, "Vulidit\- a.s Moral Obligation" Southern Speech JoumaL
33 (1968), pp. 215-222,
" Ibid., p. 218.
" Ibid., p. 217.
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of kinds of facts promulgated to support a contention. There seems to be
a type of "king-of-the-hill" imperative that debaters adhere to—^presuming
that the team with the largest pile of note cards is victor. Often debaters
will cart several fileboxes of empty cards to a meet for the psychological
effect it has on both the opposition and the judges. Although the more
perceptive judges can pierce this facade, one must remember that this
"technique" is less than logical. Some isolated facts are a sine qua non
to the conclusion, while others are parenthetic, at best. In neither case
does an abundance of facts enhance argumentative vahdity.
Within this context one can also note that, since the presentation of
facts is a function of the advocate who presents them and not subject
to total scrutiny by the opposition, testimony can and generally is hfted
out of context and rather distorted. This demonstrates a further inadequacy
of facts per se being a major determinant of validity.
The final and ultimate source of validity, as expounded by Douglas
Ehninger, is that the argument as a whole "forces a fundamental re
adjustment in the thinking of the person to whom it is addi-essed."i® This
reversion to "situation logic" presupposes an operational knowledge of
logic on the part of all debaters. The question of whether there exist
inherent logical patterns in our rhetoric and thought is so controversial
itself, that to assume not only that such patterns exist but also that these
ordered relations are endemically logical is the rankest form of the fallacy
of a suggestive question.
However, the importance of inductive reasoning must not be ignored.
Formal logic epitomizes the significance of formal validity over material
validity. In criticizing the role of formal logic in debate Dr.- William
Smith of Stanford University suggests that a fallacy of reasoning can only
be a sign suggesting investigation of the material validity of an argument,
not a fatal invalidation of the reasoning process.^'' In distinguishing
between the two means of reasoning we note that deductive logic assumes
the world does not change and that matter can be elassified in independent
and exclusive categories. Inductive reasoning holds the world is in a
constant state of flux and that all matter is continuous and cannot he
classified in exclusive categories.^® With this distinction it seems evident
that material validity is equivalent to formal validity in import, at least
within the debate setting.
Working independently of the material content, formal logic assumes
reason, as opposed to verification, to be the supreme and only test of
validity. By operating independently of the world deductive logic further
assumes that one form of logic can be extracted from one situation and
be applied to other times and places. With respect to this last point,
F. C. S. Schiller states, "It is impossible to abstract from the actual use
of logical material and to consider 'forms of thought' in themselves, with
out incurring thereby a total loss, not only of truth but also of meaning."^®
Argumentative considerations must transcend the static argument form if
absolute validity is to be achieved. In addition to these flaws of the
^Ihid., p. 219.
"William S. Smith, op. cit., p. 335.
"^Ihid., p. 335.
" F. C. S. Schiller, Formal Logic, A Scientific and Social Problem (London:
Macmillan and Co., 1931), p. xiii.
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static deductive reasoning, there are motivational and artistic arguments
that debaters employ but that deductive logic can not handle.
Although most contemporary advocates adhere to the inductive im
perative, the form of their arguments must not go ignored. A proper
convergence of these seems to materialize in Stephen Toulmin's "syllogism
lying on its side." In The Uses of Argument Toulmin presents a formal
structural model which not only presents a substantive imperative for
arguments to conform to but also displays a system which can analyze
"artistic" proofs that employ arguments as their nucleus.'^'^
For Toulmin, an argument is a dynamic movement of accepted data
through a warrant to a claim?-^ The data corresponds to the accepted
definition of evidence. The initial point of departure in an argument
must be some inductively accepted premise in order for the argument to
possess structural vahdity. The claim is the conclusion you wish to estab
lish. It may be either the ultimate or intermediate end of an argument
but, for Toulmin, it is always of a controversial nature. The data-claim
hookup is the main proof line of this framework; it is the contention
asserted. The warrant is the intermediate connective that "carries" the
data to the claim, establishing the causal link for acceptance of the claim
through the data.
There is a second proof line that operates along with the warrant but
that is not a necessary condition for a valid data-claim hookup. One
element is the backing, which presents the credentials that justify the
assumption of the warrant and which is usually employed before antag
onistic audiences. The rebuttal element recognizes those limiting areas
to which the claim wiU not be apphcable, thus attempting to meet ob
jections to the argument before they occur. The qualifier admits the
degree of confidence (possibly, probably, etc.) that the claim possesses.
A second look at Toulmin's analysis demonstrates that the structural
necessity he requires seems to keep the sense of Aristotle's categorical
syllogism while permitting enough "leg-room" for the demands of in
ductive reasoning and of the debate framework itself. By graphical analog
we can see how the traditional syllogism fits into Toulmin's structure:
Data
In Hammer v. Dagenhart &
Bailey v. Drexel the Supreme
Ct. prevented Congress from
regulating child labor.
t
Since
TOULMIN MODEL
>  Qualifier >-
Probably
Claim
(Warrant)
It was socially desirable for
Congress to regulate child labor.
t
Because
(Backing)
Children under 14 were working
in factories/children under 16
Supreme Ct., therefore
has made socially harm
ful decisions
Unless
(Rebuttal)
Congress acted unconstitutionally
when it sought to use the inter
state commerce clause and the
power to tax to regulate child
labor.
"Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (London:
Press, 1964), pp. 94-188.
^'Ibid., pp. 94-188.
Cambridge University
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were working in mines & quar
ries/children were working more
than 8 hours a day/etc.
Above argument in syllogism form:
MAJOR PREMISE: All decisions which prevent Congress from regulating child
labor are socially harmful decisions.
MINOR PREMISE: Some decisions of the Supreme Court are decisions which
preclude the Congress from regulating child labor.
CONCLUSION: Therefore, some of the decisions of the Supreme Court are
socially harmful decisions.
(in this syllogism, the warrant is unstated & the qualifier, the backing,
and the rebuttal are omitted.)
Although his analysis is vulnerable in several areas,^® Toulmin's structure
can claim superiority over traditional modes of analysis for several reasons:
first, as opposed to traditional logic, Toulmin's analysis meets the arguments
of deductive reasoning mentioned above. His analysis assumes the world
to be in a constant state of flux, giving verification by way of the warrant
at least equal status to that of reasoning. Toulmin's structure further
presupposes the inferential nature of reasoning by displaying arguments
as a step-by-step process as opposed to establishing exclusive and ex
haustive categories.
A second advantage lies in the fact that Toulmin's structure requires the
substantiation of an argument's underlying assumptions through the war
rant, whereas deductive logic tends to assume the warrant a priori. This
distinguishes the "warrant-establishing" process of Toulmin's structure from
the "warrant-using" process of traditional reasoning.®®
Another advantage of Toulmin's structure is that, through its second
proof line of rebuttal, backing and qualifier, it seeks to establish contingent
rather than universal contentions. For, by giving each step in the proof
a "geographical" spot in his analytical structure, Toulmin provides a more
structural analysis for the argument and its parts.
However, in transcending the static conception of deductive reasoning,
Toulmin's structure does not completely abandon traditional logic. By
providing a structural necessity within the essentially inductive imperative
of debate which can remain constant but change as demanded by the
situation, Toulmin has achieved a somewhat successful synthesis of the
two disciplines.®^
Proponents of Toulmin's analysis maintain that most conceivable argu
ments can be explicated within this framework.®® A distinction can be
made between purely deductive, inartistic arguments, where the data
unequivocally establishes the claim without the use of a warrant, and
artistic arguments where validity is a function of the innovative powers
of the advocate in manipulating the warrant. Within the realm of artistic
reasoning Toulmin suggests three all-inclusive categories that account for
traditionally used argument forms: first, the warrant can be used to
" Wayne Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger, "Toulmin on Argument: An
Interpretation and Application" Quarterly Journal of Speech, 54 (October, 1968),
pp. 44-55.
'"Ibid., pp. 47-50.
^ Stephen Toulmin, op, cit., pp. 135-178.
Wayne Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger, op. cit., pp. 46-49.
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establish the claim by assuming a relationship is existent among phenomena
in the world. These substantive or logical arguments reason either from
sign or from cause, or from generalization or from parallel case or from
analogy or from classification. The arguments in the second category,
traditionally called ethical, are described as authoritative and purport to
establish the claim through an assumption about the quality of the source
from which the data came. Those in the third, called pathetic or moti
vational, attempt to establish the claim through the inner values and
attitudes held by the audience.
By way of summary it seems evident that the logical ills of collegiate
debate are far from exhaustive. One can further see a number of draw
backs to both inductive and deductive reasoning. However, it seems that
Toulmin's analytical structure, together with a working knowledge of in
formal fallacies, provides the best solution to the illogicality of the col
legiate debate as well as a resolution of the deductive—inductive dilemma.
Toulmin's structure approximates the stable analytical framework of tra
ditional logic while providing adaptation of this structure to changing
situations.
The issues presented in this paper are by no means exhaustive ends but
hopefully are dynamic incentives to further analysis and resolution of the
"illogical logic" of the coUegiate debate setting. I hope this present analysis
has promulgated just as many questions as it has solved with respect to
collegiate debate.
'Ibid., pp. 48-53.
Now Available
CURRENT CRITICISM
Twenty essays which appeared in the Current Criticism department
of Speaker and Gavel between 1966 and 1970 have been reprinted as
a paperback book by Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha.
These studies provide a lively panorama of the significant themes
to which contemporary speakers address themselves. The agonies of
the Vietnam decisions and the emergence of the 'Tolack power" issue
stiikingly dominate the concerns of speakers and critics alike, but
other issues as well are given rhetorical analysis in this volume.
Copies of Current Criticism may be obtained for $2.50 from
Theodore Walwik, National Secretary, DSR-TKA, Slippery Rock
State CoUege, Slippery Rock, Penna. 16057. They are also available
from the Speech Communication Association, Statler Hilton Hotel,
New York, N.Y. 10001.
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THE ROLE OF FORMAL LOGIC IN ARGUMENTATION
John Bertolotti
The role which formal logic should play in argumentation has been
contested for some time by the theorists of argument^ At issue has been
whether rigorous philosophical argument and its primary tool, the syllogism,
are useful in understanding what is often referred to as "marketplace
argumentation."2 My position is that formal logic, properly used, is a
relevant tool for the understanding of everyday argument. The asserted
shortcomings of formal logic result, not from inherent flaws, but from
misapplication by the theorists of argument. As Hugh G. Petrie has
observed,
.  . . tlie failures attributed to logic are surely failures not of logic,
but rather of the practitioners, or better, mispractitioners of logic.'
I have chosen to analyze two issues which I feel are key to the dispute:
the material validity of premises and the clarity of logical connectives.
With regard to tbe first issue, formal logic is often faulted because it
provides no method for evaluating the truth or falsity of the premises
used. An argument based on a false premise can be logically true, as
can an argument based on an unproven value premise. Ehninger and
Brockriede, in extolling the advantages of the informal Toulmin model of
argument, stated.
The Toulmin model emphasizes the factual analysis of a unit of proof
and material validity by investigating a unit of proof within the context
of all related infonnation; the syllogism, more concemed with class
relationships, emphasizes formal validity.^
While the allegation is, in a sense, true, it stems from an over-extension
of the purpose of logic. Logic is concemed with relational, not factual,
analysis. The logical validity of an argument depends on whether the
conclusion follows from the premises. Formal logic does not rule out any
questioning of premises; they can be rejected on their merits. In fact, if
a seemingly acceptable premise leads to an obviously absurd conclusion,
then the syllogism has provided a test for that premise and it can then
be rejected. Ehninger and Brockriede attack formal logic because its
premises can at times be supported only by extralogical operations. They
then proceed to demonstrate the usefulness of the Toulmin model by
supporting a premise in one example with the assertion that economist
'Y' says it's tme, certainly an extralogical operation.® The proposed system
John Bertolotti is a student at the University of Alabama and Student National
President of Delta Sigma Rho—Tau Kappa Alpha.
King Broadrick, "The Relationship of Argument to Syllogistic and Experimental
Logic," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXVI (December, 1950), pp. 476-482.
' Ray Lyim Anderson and David O. Mortensen, "Logic and Marketplace Argu
mentation," Quarterly Journal of Speech, LIU (April, 1967), pp. 143-151.
' Hugh G. Petrie, "Does Logic have any Relevance to Argumentation?," Journal
of the American Forensic Association, VI (Spring, 1969), p. 59.
Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, Decision by Debate, (New York:
Dodd, Mead and Co., 1967), p. 99.
"Ibid., p. 107.
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of informal logic reveals nothing that logiciains have not known for centuries.
If anything, it is not a 'new logic but a different framework for an old
logic.
A somewhat more complex issue is that of the clarity of logical con
nectives, such as 'if—then.' The degree to which logical connectives are
understood is important, since they establish the relation between premises
and conclusion which is essential to any argument. Formal logic is faulted
in this area because of the difficulty in translating statements of inference
which are used in conventional argument into the rigorously defined con
nectives used by logicians. Anderson and Mortensen wrote.
Unfortunately for the critic, the inference-carrying powers of most
connective terms in conventional arguments do not behave as do their
counterparts in formal systems. Ordinarily, there is no way of extracting
from rhetorical arguments some set of logical constants with equivalent
meanings to be credited with defining the movement from premises to
conclusion."
This is admittedly a major obstacle to the analysis of marketplace argument,
and some difficulty is involved. Yet the question is whether another system
can provide greater clarity. If a connective is unclear in its meaning and
thus not translatable into logical form, leaving it in its unclear form and
labelling it a 'context-variant warrant,' as in the Toulmin model, will
provide no greater clarity. By the same token, if a connective has emotional
components which lend additional force to the argument, informal logic
fails just as surely as formal logic to take that force into account. Mills and
Petrie pointed out,
.  . . although such translation may necessarily lose some of the emotional
impact, that is totally irrelevant to the role of logie proper in rhetoric,
even though the emotional impact cannot be ignored in a more compre
hensive rhetorical analysis . . . . formal logic is explicitly designed to
exhibit in the most perspicuous way those features of propositions which
contribute to the validity of the arguments in which they appear.'
Although a connective may be value-laden, logical analysis is not precluded.
The objections raised to the adequacy of formal coimectives is another
case of the over-extension of formal logic.
Formal logic provides a system whereby relational questions about prop
ositions may be tested. To expect it to do more than that is unreahstic.
Systems of informal logic, in particular the highly touted Toulmin model,
do not invalidate formal logic or substantially improve upon it. At best,
the Toulmin model offers another conceptual framework in which to con
sider extralogical factors and any claim which is made for it beyond that
is unwarranted.
° Anderson and Mortensen, p. 146.
' Glen E. Mills and Hugh G. Petrie, "The Role of Logic in Rhetoric," Quarterly
Journal of Speech, LIV (October, 1968), p. 266.
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ACCESS TO THE BROADCAST FORUM:
A RHETORICAL PROBLEM
J. Michael Sproule
It seems fitting that Olympic and Presidential contests follow parallel
quadrennial cycles. Both are political, and while the Olympiad might
squirm under the rubric, "political," no one would deny the partisan
credentials of an American Presidential election. Of the many issues sur
rounding a contest for the office of chief executive, most are rhetorical—
subject to opinion and argument. Yet, while the question of the moment
might he political ethics, campaign costs or the use of "spot" commercials,
one single issue predominates—the need to assure fair access to broadcast
facilities.
The question of access to broadcast communication has been viewed
as both political and legal. However, the issue is essentially rhetorical
since it involves a speaker's very ability to communicate his ideas to the
society at large. Every rhetorical effort assumes, at a minimum, access
to a channel of communication. Much has been said about attempts to
shout down one's opponent in a face-to-face situation—i.e., heckling—
less has been written about the rhetorical problem posed by legaUy-
sanetioned unequal access to communication channels for political candidates.
The democratic ideal—^founded in classic libertarian thought—assumes
that the best ideas and men (the truth) wiU triumph through a process of
dialectie in which the merits of all sides are debated.^ The tradition of
equal opportunity for political candidates may be further traced to Aristotle,
who held that in a democracy, magistrates should be chosen by lot.^
Today, however, pohtical decisions can be made on the basis of the abihty
of one candidate to literally drown out his opponent via greater use of the
media of mass communieation.
Lloyd Bitzer argues that the total environment governs the production
of discourse. "When I ask. What is a rhetorical situation?" writes Bitzer,
"I want to know the nature of those contexts in which speakers or writers
create rhetorical discourse; How should they be described?"® Bitzer's
concern for the controlling set of circumstances which shapes a particular
rhetorical response may be compared to Burke's discussion of the impact
of a particular scene and agency on the conduct of rhetors.^ The focus
in both philosophical conceptions is on those controlling forces which, by
their nature, breathe a certain spirit into a particular message. Just as a
situation of sorrow calls forth eulogy so too does the imderlying frame of
broadcast law shape the contours of political discourse—who hears what
J. Michael Sproule is Director of Forensics at Ohio State University.
^ Fred S. Siehert, "The Libertarian Theory of the Press," in Four Theories of
the Press (University of Illinois Press, 1956), p. 41.
^ Aristotle, Politics VI. 2. 1317b.
^ Lloyd Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 1 (January,
1968), 1-2.
■* See especially a situational application of Burke in Richard E. Crable and
John J. Makay, "Kenneth Burke's Concept of Motives in Rhetorical Theory,"
Today's Speech, XX (Winter, 1972), 11-18.
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from whom. The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the rhetorical
implications of current media access law.
Access to the Political Forum
Political communication has always depended on the technology of
society. In the pre-electronic era direct communication was bounded only
by the strength of the voice, capacity of the hall or height of the platform.
Legal concern for equal opportunity to communicate was only negative in
the form of prohibitions against attempts to forcefuUy suppress or silence
a candidate. Legal safeguards to guarantee equal access to the public
eye and ear were unnecessary for candidates did not differ in their ability
to travel and speak—although early nineteenth century custom mitigated
against extensive stump or "whistle-stop" campaigns. While newspapers
openly backed candidates, such indirect support was also relatively equal.
The costs of founding a newspaper were small.
The state of the art of communication was radically altered by perfection
of mass point-to-point communication—electronic broadcasting. The devel
opment of radio allowed a single communicator to capture and control
the attention of millions. The pohtical implications of the new device
were not long ignored. Campaign broadcasting was well developed by
the time of the depression. Yet, in the Radio Act of 1927 lawmakers
chose to treat political access to the new medium as a commodity to be
bought, sold or given only by the station owner.® Broadcasting by candidates
for public office was not seen as a right owing to the candidates or to
their audience.
In 1934, the new Federal Communications Act superseded the old
Radio Act.® Section 18 of the radio law was incorporated virtually intact
into the new commimications law as Section 315.'^ This section became
(and still is) the basis of law in political broadcasting. The section dealt
chiefly with limitations on broadcaster-donated free time to candidates.
Broadcasters were to accord "equal opportunity" to "legally qualified"
candidates for the same office. The program time purchased by candidates
was treated in the first amendment to the section which came in 1952.
Congress prohibited the then-common practice of charging candidates higher
rates for political broadcasts than were normally assessed non-commercial
programs. A second amendment came suddenly in 1959 when Congress
exempted certain forms of "bona fide" news programs from the general
requirement of "equal opportunity." This legislation was prompted by a
FCC ruling granting equal opportrmity to perennial candidate Lar (America
First) Daly on grounds that his opponent, the incumbent Mayor of Chicago,
had been shown in certain newsclippings. A final amendment to the
political broadcasting section was the temporary suspension of "equal
opportunity" for the 1960 presidential and vice-presidential campaigns.
The suspension did not apply to any other office and has not been
renewed.
Section 315 and the Problem of Access
While the political broadcasting section of the Communications Act
prevented outright discrimination in the provision of free and paid time
■44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
'48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
'48 Stat. 1088 (1934).
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(a negative provision much like earlier laws preventing forceable silencing
of an opponent) the law did nothing to assure positive media access to
candidates. In fact, the section specifically allowed a station to refuse
all requests for political communication: "No obligation is hereby imposed
upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate."
Further, it has long been argued that Section 315 actually inhibits
political dialogue. Many broadcasters and some commentators on broad
casting argue that this requirement causes such extra expense and effort
that media managers refrain from providing any free sustaining time to
candidates. Office-seekers are forced to turn to paid broadcast advertising
as their sole means of communicating to mass audiences. Thus, it is
reasoned, repeal of Section 315 will increase availability of the electronic
media by: (1) giving incentive to broadcasters, and (2) lessening the
need for paid broadcast advertising. These claims merit investigation.
The belief that Section 315 works to reduce broadcasting time offered
to candidates is long-standing and commonly held. Industry spokesmen—
Stanton (CBS), Goodman (NBC), Adams (ABC), Sarnoff (NBC)—
argue to this effect.® Editorials in Broadcasting Magazine take a similar-
position." John W. Dean summarizes these claims.
Broadcasters persuasively argue that they cannot grant free hroadeast
time because of Section 315. If free time is given to major or leading
candidates it must be given to all other candidates. The broadcaster
can neither afford this from the standpoint of losses of revenue during
the free programming nor the loss of audience that would result if there
were a large number of splinter group candidates. The result is that
time must be purchased by any who wish broadcasting time."
Of further interest is the fact that network broadcasters promise sig
nificant amoimts of free time if Section 315 is repealed. On June 10,
1971, Dr. Frank Stanton pledged CBS to the provision of eight hours
of free time for major Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in
the 1972 election. ABC was willing to match the offer.i^
In general, however, the case for an across-the-board repeal of Section
315 would not appear promising in light of surveys revealing local station
reluctance to provide free time where there are only two candidates for
office.i® But, on the Presidential level such a repeal might work, given
network promises of free time. And to this end FCC chairman Dean
Burch favors abolition of "equal time" for Presidential contests.
® See for e.xample Adams and Samoff in U.S. Congress, Senate, Presidential
Campaign Broadcasting Act, Hearings before the Communications Snbcommittee
of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2nd sess.,
I960, pp. 230-33.
° See Editorial, Broadcasting, July 20, 1970, p. 74 and Editorial, Broadcasting,
August 24, 1970, p. 70.
"John W. Dean, "Political Broadcasting: The Communications Act of 1934
Revisited," Federal Communications Bar Journal, XX (1966), 40.
"Frank Stanton, U.S. Congress, House, Political Broadcasting—1971, Hearings
before the Subeommittee on Communications and Power of the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 92nd Cong., 1st
sess., I97I, p. 149.
"Everett Erlick, Political Broadcasting—1971, p. 184.
"Herbert E. Alexander, E. Stimson Bullitt and Hyman H. Coldin, "The High
Costs of TV Campaigns," Television Quarterly, V, No. I (Winter 1966) 50,
64-65.
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Paid Broadcast Advertising
Although discussion of Section 315 and network time is widespread
it may be increasingly irrelevant. Indeed, recent campaign statistics seem
to show that the real fact of access is one of paid political advertising—
much of it on local stations. More than ninety per cent of television
stations responding to a survey reported significant sales of paid time
excluding network sales.^^ And the sale of national and local broadcast
time will increase irrespective of the Communications Act. Dean observes
that, "Section 315 does not prevent one candidate from attempting to
outspend his competitors in purchasing broadcast time, so as to cause
an unbalanced political coverage."^® We may assume that even with
greater free time candidates would choose to purchase spot advertisements
so as to increase their recognition.^® The continuing desire to spend more
is borne out by the comments of former Republican Party Chairman,
Thruston Morton. "I think," he said, "1 can safely speak for both myself
and my opposite number that we will be as vigorous as we can in raising
money because there are always demands for programs that have a sub
stantial cost."!''
The evidence that additional free time would not lessen the furious
pace of broadcast advertising goes a long way toward proving the claim
that the cause of increased campaign costs is broadcasting itself, not
Section 315. The electronic media have greatly affected campaign finance,
for radio-television advertising is the major cost factor in many political
campaigns.!® "pjjg figures on broadcast spending and the effect of that
spending are significant. Some argue that our national elections are fast
becoming situations where the party with the most money gains the
advantages of broadcast communication.!® And few would doubt that
broadcast costs will rise in the future.®"
The Need for Access: A Growing Concern
It is inescapable, then, that the increased costs of paid time have
become the major barrier to equitable access to the broadcast forum.
And for some time the intellectual and legal groundswell for guaranteed
political access has been growing. One of the strongest endorsements of
the right of access to the media came in the form of a 1946 ruling by the
FCC that the constitutional right of free speech implied reasonable access
to broadcast facilities.®! Indeed, early rulings by the Commission tended
to chip away the provision in 315 that broadcasters could exclude all
candidate use of station facilities.®® George O. Cillingham, retired chief
" Richard D. Porter, "Some Values to the Broadcaster of Election Campaign
Broadcasting," Journal of Broadcasting, VII (Spring, 1963), 146.
"Dean, 42-43.
" Alexander, et. al., 52 and 63.
"Thruston Morton, Presidential Campaign Broadcasting Act, p. 31.
" Committee for Economic Development, Financing a Better Election System
(Washington: CED, 1968), pp. 7-8 and Rowland Evans, "TV in the Political
Campaign," Television Quarterly, V, No. 1 (Winter, 1966), 25-26.
"Edward W. Chester, Radio, Television and American Politics (New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1969), p. 280.
"Dean, 16.
A3 Pike and Fischer R.R. 259 (1946). See also 11 FCC 312 (1946).
"10 FCC 515 (1945), 11 FCC 989 (1947), and 13 FCC 1246 (1949).
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of the FCC Office of Reports and Information, reinforced this opinion in
1968. "Though Section 315 states that 'no obligation is hereby imposed
upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any candidate,' the
Commission regards political broadcasts as an element of public service,
and, accordingly questions stations that do not carry any."^^
With the increased costs of paid political message sending much effort
has been made to legally regulate candidate access via a ceiling on allow
able broadcast spending. In 1970 legislation to this effect was passed by
both Houses of Congress. The President vetoed this on October 12, 1970
alleging that it discriminated unfairly against broadcasters. However, hke-
minded efforts resulted in enactment of the new Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971.24 In the section on campaign communications the law specifically
acknowledges the importance of media access for political candidates and
limits broadcast spending to sixty per cent of the overall spending ceiling
for each federal candidate.
The limits on broadcast spending provided for in the legislation are
useful, but problems of aceess remain. The legislation in no way guarantees
time to every candidate—^for the burden of securing time is still a private
one. In other words, the opportunity to communicate a political message
is still a matter of purchasing a commodity, not exercising a right. This
basic rhetorical problem is compounded: although the potential imbalance
is limited, candidates will continue to differ in abilities to raise the sums
of money necessary to gain an audience. Senator McGovem faced this
problem in the 1972 election campaign, reporting difficulty in financing
the allowable level of broadcast spending.^s In 1968 the situation was
more stark: candidate Nixon outspent candidate Humphrey two-to-one
in broadcast communication. Representative John H. Murphy suggests
that in such a close election broadcast differentials may be critical.26
One mitigating fact must be remembered, however. There is little
evidence to support the thesis that the candidate spending the most on
broadcasting always wins. Yet, to argue from this that differential access
is inherently "not harmful" is to miss the point. The existence of unequal
opportunity to communicate political messages exerts a deleterious in
fluence on the quality of American campaign rhetoric. The present frame
work of law requires that candidates spend much time and effort merely
to secure an audience—time which could be better spent in communication.
The media-induced financial burden injects an irrelevant factor into elec
tions: candidate ability to pay. Further, the resulting advertisement format
does little to initiate meaningful discussion of the candidates and issues.
James L. Golden has argued that the quality of American political dia
logue has declined. Certainly, the pressures of paid media campaigning
have contributed to this phenomenon.
One alternative to the commodity-purchase plan of media exposure
is to provide free time to all federal candidates as a matter of right. To
" George O. Gillingham, "That Foggy Program Gontrol Issue," Television
Age, XV (May 6, 1968), 26.
^Public Law 92-225, approved February 7, 1972.
^ "Money Runs Out, McGovem Says," Columbus Citizen-Journal, October 5,
1972, p. 7.
Political Broadcasting—1971, p. 65.
""James L. Golden, "Political Speaking since the 1920's: Ghanges in the Idiom,"
Vital Speeches, XXIX, No. 24 (October 1, 1963), 763-67.
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this end several bills were introduced into the Ninety-Second Congress.^®
Most of them provided apportionment of blocks of "voters time" in varying
amounts for major and minor party candidates with the charges to be
home by the U.S. Treasury. This plan has the advantage of removing
all legally-based differential access barriers. The "voters time" concept
might have the further effect of dampening the use of advertising technology
to "sell" candidates. The format of political broadcasts could be controlled
and the use of mini-messages or "spots" eliminated. Such might easily
have the effect of improving the relevance and quahty of American political
dialogue.
Access to Broadcast Facilities: Whither or Wither?
There can be little doubt that the enactment of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 has improved the opportunity of candidates to
achieve equal access to mass communication facilities. The law eliminates
the potential for infinite margins of advantage for one candidate over
another. The limitation of broadcast spending goes a long way toward
implementing the emerging notion that candidates for public office deserve
opportunities to communicate with mass audiences and that such oppor
tunities should be apportioned fairly. Yet, access under the law is still
handled on a fee-for-service basis allowing for mass communication in
equities based solely on ability to pay. As the right to "free speech" is
first among constitutional amendments, so, too, is fair availability of the
public forum basic to the electoral process. The marketplace of ideas
concept allows no room for prior idea-sorting via the dollar sign. Those
inequities now sanctioned rmder law are political but they have a rhetorical
dimension. A communicative act requires use of a channel of communication.
That such use is yet tempered by a financial barrier amounts to a rhetorical
problem.
' H.R. 5090, H.R. 5091, H.R. 5092, H.R. 6112, H.R. 7911.
SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION
The Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha National Council has established
a standard subscription rate of $5.00 per year for Speaker and Gavel.
Present policy provides that new members, upon election, are provided
with two years of Speaker and Gavel free of charge. Life members, further
more, who have paid a Life Patron alumni membership fee, of $100, likewise
regularly receive Speaker and Gavel. Also receiving each issue are the cur
rent chapter sponsors and the libraries of institutions holding a charter in the
organization.
Other individuals and hbraries are welcome to subscribe to Speaker and
Gavel. Subscription orders should be sent to Allen Press, P. O. Box 368,
Lawrence, Kansas 66044.
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THE MASTER INDEX
Bhad Bishop
"Hey Colleague, have you got anything to refute that second need
contention? I can't find a thing."
"I know I've got something somewhere, but I can't remember where
I put it. It's either on a note card or in a dark green pamphlet."
"Listen, I'll get up and use my evidence against the first point and you
keep looking for it. . ."
The above conversation is not an unusual one. It could be overheard
during the last few minutes of many first affirmative constructdves as the
negative team frantically rifles through their information to find evidence
they know is there. This situation could be avoided if debaters used a
system of recording evidence which I have termed the MASTER INDEX.
Very simply, the MASTER INDEX is a total organization of all evidence
by subject, in index form, so that the debater can very quickly glance
at the index and be reminded of what evidence he has on a specific point
and where it can be located. The purpose of this article is to explain
what the MASTER INDEX is and the advantages to be derived from
its use.
Nearly every debate text contains at least one chapter on research
dealing with the gathering and recording of information to be used in
a debate. However, most only go so far as to explain where to find
information and how to record it on a note card. After absorbing this
basic information, each debater, through experience and the trial and
error metliod, usually devises his own system of putting his evidence
where he can get to it. Some use the file box system, recor^g affirmative
and negative evidence on index cards and filing each card under general
categories relating to the stock issues involved in the proposition. Others
use the file folder system, devoting a folder to each of the stock cases
they might meet during a season. Others use both, along with books,
pamphlets, and magazines underhned and carried in the briefcase for
possible reference. Each of these systems, as well as many others, has
worked well for individual debaters through the years. However, the
system to be explained in this article has several distinct advantages over
these and it has been proven successful by those who have tried it.
What is the MASTER INDEX? It is an orderly system of recording
aU evidence on a central master sheet or sheets in index form. The index
allows the debater to survey all of his evidence without looking through
his file box, magazines, etc. It is based on a system using a code in the
form of letters, numbers, and a coloring system. The evidence is arranged
according to cases and possible contentions and not as unrelated categories.
The mechanics of the index can best be understood by first examining
a sample of segments from an affirmative and negative index. The fol
lowing sample is taken from one contention of an index on the 1966-67
collegiate debate proposition, "Resolved: That the United States should
substantially reduce its foreign policy commitments."
Brad Bishop is Director of Forensics at Samford University.
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SAMPLE CONTENTION FROM
Affirmative MASTER INDEX
1. Europe can defend itself
Europe's economy is strong
Europe has more gold
Europe has military power
Europe will have the bomb
Negative MASTER INDEX
1. Europe can not defend itself
Not enough money
Economy weak
Military weak
Russia too strong
A MASTER INDEX ON A NATO CASE
A123
M099
B189
A129
N013
N019
B023
B072
Church
US News
Rusk
McNamara
Wilson
LBJ
Brosio
Eisenhower
1966
1965
1964
1967
1966
1966
1967
1964
From left to right under each contention the columns represent the
subject to be dealt with, the index code, the source, and the date of
each particular piece of evidence in support of the contention. The index
code, as is readily seen, is divided into three general ciphers: those
beginning with A or N (A123 or N013), those beginning with B (B023),
and those beginning with M (M099). An A or N cipher indicates evidence
cards, affirmative and negative respectively, contained in the file box, A
B cipher indicates books or pamphlets. And an M cipher indicates maga
zines.
Following each letter are some numbers. The first two numbers make
up the first ordinate. These further narrow the evidence down by selecting
a particular category, book, or magazine. For example, the first two numbers
of N0I3 indicate the first category of the negative card file; the first
two numbers of B023 indicate book number two; the first two numbers
of M099 indicate magazine number nine. The remaining number or num
bers then identifies the particular piece of evidence sought. NO 13 would
then refer to the third card under the first category in the negative card
section. B023 would mean the third quotation in book number two and
M099 would refer to the ninth quotation in magazine number nine.
In action, the MASTER INDEX is quite simple to use. Let's say
that your opponent has just presented the contention that Europe can
defend itself. You would then go to your MASTER INDEX of negative
information under the appropriate contention. Here, using only the index,
you can survey all the evidence you have on that point without shuffling
through cards or thumbing through magazines. You decide to use the
Wilson quote that says that Europe does not have enough money to
defend itself—N0I3. You then go to your negative card box, first category,
third card. This operation is identical for A, B ox M ciphers also.
To prepare your evidence for the MASTER INDEX, merely catalogue
your cards by the appropriate numbers, and insert tabs into books and
magazines for easy reference. Then divide your evidence into cases and
subdivide it into possible contentions for a negative index or into the
contentions for your affirmative case. To further simplify matters a coloring
system is helpful. All negative information could be colored yellow (card
categories marked, tabs for books, magazines, etc.) and all affirmative
evidence could be colored blue.
There are several distinct advantages of using the MASTER INDEX
system. The first is that the debater can locate his evidence easily and
quickly. The index provides a very quick reference in the hour allotted
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to a debate by telling the debater not only the entire scope of evidence
he has for refutation on a certain point, but exactly where it is located.
The debater who is in the habit of collecting two full brief cases of
material would find this advantage very worthwhile. Further, it allows
the debater a choice in shades of meaning so that exactly the right
evidence can be selected. By being able to select quickly the evidence
that applies to specific contentions of each case, the debater can avoid
using the "stock block of evidence" that can be generally applied to any
stock issue of a proposition.
Another advantage of using the index is that the debater will have
more time to organize his own attack and listen to the presentation of
his opponent. This allows him to concentrate on how he will say things
as well as what he will say. Also, by having the author or source of the
information hsted on the index, the astute debater can scan this column
for particular spokesmen quoted by the opposition to see if he has evidence
by the same sources to use against them.
Another consideration in using the index is that it aids in organizational
work before the tournament season ever begins. As the debater begins
to accumulate his evidence from various sources and brings it together
in one heap, tlie MASTER INDEX helps to organize it into a meaningful
tool. As the season progresses the debater will be finding new evidence
and with the index he is never unsure of where he can use it. Following
each tournament the debater can easily add to or revise the index by
concentrating his research in areas where his index lacked • needed support
during the debates.
This index system also helps to boost n the confidence of beginning de
baters. With the index before him, the novice debater is relieved of
the fear of hurriedly thumbing through many note cards to locate a specific
piece of evidence. By compiling his own index and keeping it up to
date, the debater can go into a debate with the confidence that at
least he knows what evidence he has and where it is located. To be sure,
he will have many opportunities to use it.
ERIC FIRST ANALYSIS
A new forensics publication, ERIC FIRST ANALYSIS: 1973-1974
NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL DEBATE TOPIC, will be available from
the Speech Communication Association April 23, 1973. The 32-page
printed document under the co-authorship of William M. Reynolds, George
Washington University, Washington, D.C. and John E. Sexton, Saint
Brendon s High School, Brooklyn, New York, will provide high school
debaters with an introductory analysis of the impending high school
topic and a selected, annotated bibliography.
An ERIC (Educational Resources Information Center) research team
directed by the co-authors and appointed by the Speech Communication
Module, ERIC Clearinghouse on Reading and Communication Skills, will
identify bibliographic resources for the document during the month of
March.
The price: 25 cents each, 15 cents each for orders of ten or more.
Order in advance from: ERIC FIRST ANALYSIS, Speech Communication
Association, Statler Hilton Hotel, New York, New York 10001. Please
enclose full payment (stamps acceptable) with each order.
21
et al.: Complete Issue 10(3)
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato,
80 SPEAKER AND GAVEL
SCHUG COMPLETES 40 YEARS AT PENN STATE
N
\
When Professor Clayton H. Schug received DSR-TKA's Distinguished
Service Award last year, he had completed 40 years of coaching the
women's debate teams at Pennsylvania State University.
During the years between 1931 and 1971 he worked with 1,072 de
baters, maintaining standards of full participation and excellence in
achievement which earned him nationwide admiration and respect. He
has frequently cited as part of his philosophy the "unrelenting policy
through the years that "everybody participates." In 1970—71, for instance,
every member who remained on the squad for at least two terms par
ticipated in one or more intercollegiate forensic tournaments. Among the
team statistics accumulated in four decades, by the way, was a total
of 146,331 miles travelled.
Clayton Schug had served as chapter sponsor for the Pennsylvania
State chapter of Delta Sigma Rho and of DSR-TKA since before I can
remember. He also was a vice-president of Delta Sigma Rho for 10
years and was an associate editor of The Gavel.
In December of 1971, more than 175 friends attended a rethement
dinner staged in his honor, where he was presented with a bound volume
of letters of appreciation and entertained with dramatizations of colorful
episodes from debate trips of the past. His own most vivid memory, he
says, was of the time when the roof of a restaurant in which the team
was taking shelter was torn off by a tornado and landed on his brand-new
Plymouth automobile.
The annual survey of Penn State Women's Forensics for 1971 provides
an interesting set of reflections on these 40 years of achievement.
Clayton Schug's friendly spirit and high standards as a speech educator
have contributed greatly to this organization and to the whole forensics
enterprise.
R.O.W.
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DSR-TKA COMMITTEES
National Conference
George Adamson (Ch.), Utah
Kenneth Andersen, Illinois
Cully Clark, Alabama
James Benson, Ball State
John Bertolotti (Student President),
Alabama
Research and Publication
James H. McBath (Ch.), USC
Distinguished Alumni Awards
Annabel Hagood (Ch.), Alabama
Wayne Callaway, Wyoming
Kathy Corey, Santa Barbara
Mike Cronen, Vermont
William R. Dresser, Denison
Standards
Forrest Coklin (Ch.), N. Iowa
Jack Howe, Long Beach State
Ronald Matlon, Massachusetts
Speaker of the Year
Peter Kane (Ch.), SUNY Brockport
Theodore Walwik, Shppery Rock
Larry Augustine, Susquehanna
Joseph O'Rourke, Wabash
Ruth McCaffey, Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Norma Cook, Tennessee
Donald Terry, Toledo
George P. Lamb, Washington, D.C.
Bernard Brock, Wayne State
Robert Friedman, Oregon
Dean Ellis, Hawaii
David Vanoil, Indiana
Clark Kimball, Madison
David Strother, Washington State
Gregg Phifer, Florida State
Owen Peterson, LSU
N. Edd Miller, Nevada
Kass Kavalcheck, VanderbBt
Constitutional Revision
Gilford Blyton (Ch.), Kentucky
Patrick Micken, William and Mary
Jack Rhodes, Utah
Cerry Sanders, Wooster
George ZiegehnueUer, Wayne State
Kenneth Andersen, Illinois
STUDENT SPEAKER-OF-THE-YEAR CONTEST
Nominations for the 1973 Student Speaker-of-the-Year Award should
be submitted to Mac Haddow, First Vice President of the National
DSR-TKA Student Council, Brigham Young University, at the National
Conference in Urbana. To be eligible, students must be members of
DSR-TKA, graduating seniors, and in attendance at the conference. A
resume should be submitted which includes a record of their performance
in intereollegiate forensics, theii' scholastic record, other extracurricular
activities, and any form of community service in which they have been
engaged.
Judgment will be made by a committee of chapter sponsors. The
recipient of the award will be announced at the final banquet of the
National Conference.
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Alabama, University, Ala.
Albion, Albion, Mich.
Alma, Alma, Mich.
American, Washington, D.C.
Auburn, Auburn, Alo.
Boll State, Muncie, Ind.
Bates, Lewiston, Me.
Berea, Berea, Ky.
Annabel D. Hagood
Jon Fitzgerald
Kenneth Plaxton
Jerome B. Polisky
Frank B. Smith
David W. Shepard
Thomas Moser
Birmingham-Southern, Birmingham, Ala.
Bridgeport, Bridgeport, Conn.
Bridgewater, Bridgewoter, Va.
Brighom Young, Provo, Utah
Brooklyn, Brooklyn, N.Y.
Brown, Providence, R.I.
Bucknell, Lewlsburg, Penno.
Butler, Indianapolis, Ind.
Margaret D. McCoy
Robert A. Dayton
C. F. Evans, Jr.
California State, Long Beach, Calif.
Capitol, Columbus, Ohio
Corlow, Pittsburgh, Penno.
. Roger E. Sappington
Jed J. Richardson
Charles Parkhurst
Barbara Tannenbaum
Frank W. Merritt
Nicholas M. Cripe
Jack Howe
Case-Western Reserve, Cleveland, Ohio .
Chicago, Chicago,
Harold Lowson
Thomas Hopkins
Ken Seminotore
Richard L. LaVarnway
Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio
Clemson, Clemson, S.C.
Colgate, Hamilton, N.Y.
Colorado, Boulder, Colo.
Colorado College, Colorado Springs, Colo.
Connecticut, Storrs, Conn.
Cornell, Ithaca, N.Y.
Arthur Fear
H. G. Behler
Robley Rhine
Cornell College, Mt. Vernon, Iowa
Creighton, Omaha, Nebr.
. James A. Johnson
.... Joseph Seocrlst
Arthur W. Rovine
. Walter F. Stromer
C. W. Post College of L. 1. University, Greenvale, N.Y.
Dartmouth, Hanover, N.H.
Davidson, Davidson, N.C.
Delaware, Newark, Del.
Denison, Granville, Ohio
Denver, Denver, Colo.
DePouw, Greencostle, Ind.
Dickinson, Carlisle, Penna.
Duke, Durham, N.C.
Rev. H. J. McAuliffe, S.J.
Arthur N. Kruger
Herbert L. James
Jean H. Cornell
Mary C. Adams
William R. Dresser
Eastern Kentucky, Richmond, Ky.
Ellzobethtown, Elizabethtown, Penno.
Emerson, Boston, Moss.
Robert O. Weiss
David Brubaker
Joseph C. Wetherby
Max B. Huss
Emory and Henry, Emory, Va.
Fairmont State, Fairmont, W. Va.
Florida, Gainesville, Fla.
Flarida State, Tallahassee, Fla.
George Washington, Washington, D.C.
Georgio, Athens, Go.
Grinnell, Grinnell, Iowa
Hamilton, Clinton, N.Y.
Jobie E. Riley
... John C. Zachoris
H. Alan Pickrell
Mike Overking
Donald E. Williams
Gregg Phifer
. George F. Henigan, Jr.
... Richard C. Huseman
William Vanderpool
J. Franklin Hunt
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Hampden-Sydney, Hampden-Sydney, Va.
Hampton Institute, Hampton, Va.
Hanover, Hanover, Ind.
Hartford, Hartford, Conn.
Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii
Hiram, Hiram, Ohio
Howard, Woshington, D.C.
Idaho, Moscow, Ida.
Illinois, Urbono,
Indiana, Bloomington, Ind.
Indiana State, Terre Haute, ind.
Iowa State, Ames, Iowa
Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa
John Carroll, Cleveland, Ohio
Kansas, Lawrence, Kan.
Kansas State, Manhattan, Kan.
Kentucky, Lexington, Ky.
Kings, Wilkes Borre, Penno'.
Knox, Golesburg, III.
Lehigh, Bethlehem, Penno.
Lincoln Memorial, Harrogate, Tenn.
Louisiana State, Baton Rouge, La.
Loyola, Baltimore, Md.
Loyola, Chicago, III.
Madison, Horrisonburg, Va.
Manchester, North Manchester, ind.
Mankato, Mankato, Minn.
Marquette, Milwaukee, VVis.
Maryland, College Pork, Md.
Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass.
Memphis State, Memphis, Tenn.
Mercer, Macon, Go.
Miami, Coral Gables, Flo.
Miami, Oxford, Ohio
Miami, Middleton, Ohio
Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
Michigan State, East Lansing, Mich. .
Minnesota, Minneapoiis, Minn.
Missouri, Coiumbia, Mo.
Morgan State, Baltimore, Md.
Murray State, Murray, Ky.
Muskingum, New Concord, Ohio
Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebr.
Nevada, Reno, Nev.
New Hampshire, Durham, N.H.
New Mexico, Albuquerque, N.M.
New Mexico Highlands, Las Vegas, N.M.
New York (University Heights), New York, N.Y.
New York (Wash. Sq.), New York, N.Y.
North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.
North Carolina-Greensboro, Greensboro, N.C.
North Dakota, Grand Forks, N.D.
Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, Iowa
D. M. Allan
Sidney Parhan
— Stanley B. Wheater
Joyce Milliken
Dean Ellis
Linda Pierce
Noel Myrick
Tom Jennes
Kenneth Andersen
Eugene C. Chenoweth
Karen M. Olson
James Weaver
Robert Kemp
Austin J. Freeley
Donn W. Parson
Vernon Barnes
J. W. Patterson
— Robert E. Connelly
Robert Seibert
— John A. Schnaible
Earl H. Smith
Harold Mixon
— L. Morgan Lavin
— Elaine Bruggemeier
Donald McConkey
Ronald L. Aungst
— Elizobeth Morehouse
John Lewinski
J. D. Maynord
— Ronald J. Matlon
Erma Clanton
Gerre G. Price
J. Robert Olion
Robert V. Friedenberg
Sue DeWine
— C. William Coiburn
_ Donald P. Cushman
— Bernard L. Brock
James Gibson
Harold B. Chinn
James Albert Tracy
Judson D. Ellertson
— Donald O. Olson
. Gordon Zimmerman
W. L. Sims
Wayne C. Eubank
Walter F. Brunet
Jack Hasch
David Leahy
J. Robert Cox
L. Dean Fadely
William Semlack
Lillian R. Wagner
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Northwestern, Evanston, III. —
Notre Dome, Notre Dome, Ind.
Oberlin, Oberlin, Ohio
Occidental, Los Angeles, Collf.
Ohio, Athens, Ohio
Ohio State, Columbus, Ohio —
David Zarefsky
Daniel J. Goulding
Gary K. Paben
Ted J. Foster
Ohio Wesleyan, Delaware, Ohio
Oklahoma, Norman, Okia -
Oregon, Eugene, Ore
Oregon State, Corvallis, Ore. —
Pace, New York, N.Y
Pacific, Forest Grove, Ore.
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania State,
Penn
J. Michael Spraule
Ed Robinson
Paul Barefield
C. Richard Keil
. Thurston E. Doler
Frank Colbourn
a. .
University Park,
Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Penna.
Purdue, Lafayette, Ind.
Queens College, Flushing, N.Y.
Randolph-Mocon, Ashlond, Vo.
Rhode Island, Kingston, R.I —
Richmond, Richmond, Va.
Roonoke, Solem, Vo.
Albert C. Hingston
Stephen Miller
Penna. Jeanne Lutz
Thomas Kane
Henry L. Ewbank
Robert M. Botscho
Edgar E. MacDonald
Richard W. Roth
Max Graebner
William R. Coulter
Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, N.Y. Joseph Fitzpatrick
Rollins, Winter Pork, Flo. Dean F. Graunke
HRutgers, New Brunswick, N.J. . James Godwin
St.
St.
St.
St.
Anselm's, Manchester, N.H John A. Lynch
Cloud State, St. Cloud, Minn. William R. McCleary
Jahn's University, Jamaica, N.Y James Hall
Lawrence, Canton, N.Y. Joan O. Donovan
Samford University, Birmingham, Ala. Brad Bishop
Son Francisco State, San Francisco, Calif. Henry E. McGuckin, Jr.
University of Son Francisco, San Francisco, Calif. James Dempsey
University of California, Santa Barbara, Calif Kathy Corey
Scronton, Scranton, Penna. Edward F. Warner
Slippery Rock State, Slippery Rock, Penna Theadore Walwik
South Alabama, Mobile, Ala Howard Pelham
South Carolina, Columbia, S.C Merrill G. Christopherson
South Dakota, Vermillion, S.D James Lancaster
Southern California, Los Angeles, Calif. James McBath
Southern Methodist, Dallas, Tex Richard Sinzinger
Southwest Missouri State, Springfield, Mo. Richard Stovall
Spring Hill, Mobile, Ala. Bettie Hudgens
Stanford, Polo Alto, Calif. Kenneth Mosier
State Univ. af N.Y. at Albany, Albany, N.Y. Richard W. Wilkie
State Univ. of N.Y., Horpur College, Binghomton, N.Y. Eugene Vosilew
Raymond S. Beard
Larry D. Augustine
Alice J. Cummings
Tampa, Tampa, Flarida Hugh Fellows
Temple, Philadelphia, Pa. Rolph Towne
Norma C. Caok
John Schunk
Texas Vernan R. McGuIre
Donald Terry
S.U.N.Y. College, Cortlond, N.Y.
Susquehonno, Selinsgrove, Penna. —
Syracuse, Syracuse, N.Y.
Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee
Texas, Austin, Texas
Texas Tech, Lubbock,
Toledo, Toledo, Ohio
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Tulone, New Orleans, Lo.
U. S. Novol Academy
Ursinus, Collegeville, Pa. . ...
Utoh, Salt Lake City, Utah ..
Utoh State, Logon, Utah
Valdosto State, Voldosta, Go.
Vonderbiit, Nashville, Tenn. .
Vermont, Burlington, Vt.
Virginio, Charlottesvllle, Va.
Ralph Colderoro
Phillip Worken
Joseph E. Vonnucchi
Jock Rhodes
—  Rex E. Robinson
Helen Thornton
Kassion Kovolcheck
-  —- Robert Huber
John Groham
Virginia Polytechnic, Blocksburg, Va E. a. Hancock
Wabosh, Crowfordsville, Ind. Joseph O'Rourke, Jr.
Wake Forest, Winston-Salem, N.C Merwyn A. Hoyes
Washington, Soint Louis, Mo Herbert E. Meti
Washington. Seattle, Wash. _ Dr. Donald Douglas
Washington ond Jefferson, Washington, Po. . Russell Church
Washington and Lee, Lexington, Va Halford Ryan
Washington State, Pullman, Wash . , John Schmidt
Wayne State, Detroit, Michigan .. George W. Ziegelmueller
Weber State, Ogden, Utoh
Wesleyan, Middlefown, Conn
Western Kentucky State, Bowling Green, Ky.
Western Michigan, Koiamozoo, Michigan
Westminster, New Wilmington, Pa.
West Virginio, Morgontown, W. Va
Whittier, Whittier, Calif
Wichito Stote, Wichito, Kansas
Willamette, Solem, Oregon
William and Mary, Williomsburg, Va. .
Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin
Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, Wisconsin .
Wittenberg, Springfield, Ohio
John 8. Heberstreet
Morguerite G. Petty
Wiliiom L. Davis
Charles R. Helgesen
... Walter E. Scheid
_. - James E. Pirkle
.  . Gerold G. Paul
M. P. Moorhouse
Howard W. Runkel
Patrick Micken
- Winston Brembeck
— . Ruth McGaffey
Ernest Dayka
Wooster, Wooster, Ohio Gerold H. Sanders
Wyoming, Loromie, Wyoming B. Wayne CoIIawoy
Xovier, Cincinnoti, Ohio Mark A. Greenberger
Yole, New Haven, Conn. Rollin G. Osterweis
Yeshiva, New York, N.Y Dovid Fleisher
TO SPONSORS AND MEMBERS
Pleose send oil communicotions relating
to initiation, certificotes of membership, key
orders, ond nomes of members to the
Notionoi Secretary. All requests for
authority to initiate ond for emblems
should be sent to the Notionoi Secre
tary and should be accompanied by
check or money order. Inasmuch as
all checks and money orders ore for
warded by the Secretary to the Na
tional Treasurer, please make them to:
"The Treasurer of Delta Sigma Rho~
Tau Kappa Alpha."
The membership fee is $10.00.
The official key of lOK (size shown
in cut on this poge) is $10.50, or the
official keypin of lOK is $11.75. A lopel
button is available for $7.00. Prices include
Federal To*. Individual key orders add 50c.
The names of new members, those elected
between September of one yeor and
September of the following yeor,
I  Appear in the November issue of
SPEAKER ond GAVEL. According to
present regulations of the society, new
members receive SPEAKER ond GAVEL
for two yeors following their initiation
if they return the record form sup
plied them of the time their applica
tion is opproved by the Executive Sec
retary and certified to the sponsor.
Following this lime all members who
wish to receive SPEAKER ond GAVEL
moy subscribe at the standard rate of
$5.00 per year.
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